From Closed to Open Doors : Portuguese Emigration under the Corporatist Regime by Baganha, Maria Ioannis B.
 
From Closed to Open Doors:
Portuguese  Emigration  under  the  Corporatist
Regime
 
Maria Ioannis B. Baganha
University of Coimbra
mbaganha@sonata.fe.uc.pt
 
Abstract
This  paper analyses  the Portuguese emigration  policy under the
corporatist regime.  It departs from the assumption that sending
countries  are  no  more  than  by  bystanders  in  the  migratory
process.  The paper  goes  a  step  further,  claiming  that  in  the
Portuguese  case,  not  only  did  the  Estado  Novo  (New  State)
control the migratory flows that were occurring, but that it used
emigration to its own advantage. I tried next to present evidence
to show that by the analysis of the individual characteristics of the
migrants and of their skills, their exodus couldn’t have harmed the
country’s economic growth during the sixties, since the percentage
of scientific and technical manpower was, when compared to other
European countries, far too  scarce to  frame an industrial labour
force higher  than  the existing  one.  The paper  concludes  that
during  this  period,  the  most  likely  hypothesis  is  that  the
Portuguese migratory flow was composed  of  migrants that were
redundant to the domestic economy.
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Introduction
The  political  sanctioning  of immigration may  foster  open-door
policies in order to maximise the country’s labour supply, it may
induce the adoption of quota systems in order to help preserve
cultural  and  political  integrity,  or  it  may  even  promote  the
incorporation of special skills and intellectual capital. In turn, the
political  sanctioning  of emigration  may  lead  to  the  selection,
promotion, or restriction of emigrants’ departures, which can and
usually  does  distort  the  composition  of  the  migratory  flow,
directly  affecting  the  level  of  remittances  that  emigration
produces and thus its impact on the sending country’s economy.
The adoption of one of these main types of policy by a receiving
or a sending state has varied historically in accordance with the
state’s own perception of domestic collective interests. The fact
that  sending  and  receiving  states  are  integral  parts  of  the
migratory process has long been recognised (e.g. Zolberg 1983).
However,  the  fact  that  this  distinctive  feature  of international
migration  has  to  be  built  into  the  conceptual  frameworks
constructed  to  explain  these  processes  has  proved  less
consensual.  In  particular,  it  should  be  admitted  that  the  role
played by the sending state is more often than not overlooked
(e.g. Böhning 1984).
The  Portuguese  case  is no exception to  this rule.  In fact,  the
main available explanations for Portuguese emigration after the
Second World War stress either the duality of Portuguese society
and the imbalances of the country’s economic structure1 or the
wage differential between Portugal and the receiving countries as
the main factors driving a growing number of migrants out of the
country.2 I do not deny the importance of either of these factors:
in  fact  the  consideration  of  domestic  conditions  is  extremely
relevant for explaining why migratory pressure was endemic in
Portugal, while higher rewards for labour abroad are essential for
understanding  why,  at  a  given  moment,  migratory  pressure
turned into  emigration.  What  I  am trying to  say  is  that  both
approaches are  lacking in several  respects as explanations for
the Portuguese migratory process.
Just  consider,  for  instance,  the  timing  of  the  Portuguese
emigration  to  France,  the  largest  recipient  of  Portuguese
emigration after World War II. The analysis of foreign arrivals in
France,  which was a major receiving country during this period
and  the  preferred  destination  for  Portuguese  emigrants,  from
1950 to 1974 clearly exemplifies this point.  Not until  1961 did
Portuguese  arrivals  exceed  a  total  of  10,000  migrants,
representing 10.5% of all  foreign arrivals in France (which that
year  numbered  160,000  persons).  Previously,  immigration  to
France was mainly composed of Italians and Spaniards.3
From 1962 onwards, Portugal had a constantly increasing share
of  the  influx  of  foreign  labour  into  France.  This  contribution
reached  its  peak  in  1970  and  1971.  Total  arrivals  numbered
255,000  in  1970,  and  218,000  in  1971,  with  the  Portuguese
representing  53%  and  51%  respectively  of  the  total  foreign
inflow.4  The Portuguese were not simply replacing the Italians
and the Spaniards numerically, they were also taking up the job
vacancies made available or unfilled by them, namely in public
works,  construction,  domestic  and  personal  services  and  in
agriculture.5  An  obvious  question  raised  by  the  schedule  of
Portuguese  emigration  to  France  raises  is,  why  didn’t  the
Portuguese compete with the Italians and the Spaniards from the
very beginning? And the answer has to be that if for no other
reason  than  the  exclusion  of  other  possibilities,  neither  the
necessary  channels  of  information  and  support  nor  political
sanctioning were sufficiently open for such competition to occur.
In  this  paper,  I  intend  to  discuss  one  of  these  frequently
disregarded  factors,  namely  the  impact  that  the  Estado  Novo
(New State), the corporatist regime that formally began in April
1933  and  ended  abruptly  in  April  1974,6  had  on  Portuguese
emigration.7  I  am particularly  interested  in  showing  that  the
distorted composition of the Portuguese migratory flow and the
high level  of remittances it generated were the direct result of
state interference in emigration. More generally speaking, I wish
to  demonstrate,  by  considering  the  Portuguese  case,  how  a
non-democratic regime, which in its fundamental law submitted
the  individual’s  right  to  freedom  of  movement  to  its  own
definition of collective interest (whether this was the composition
of  the  domestic  labour  market  or  the  state  colonial  aims  in
Africa),  changed  from  an  anti-emigration  policy  to  a  quota
system policy and ended up subscribing to an open-door policy,
in response to its own changes in economic policy. Moreover, in
the process, the regime used to its own advantage the openness
that characterised the Western European labour market from the
Second World War to the oil-crisis of 1973 -1974.
Portuguese Emigration Policy
As in many other respects, Portuguese emigration policy during
the Estado Novo represents a break with the past. In fact, while
until  1933  the  liberal  rights  of  freedom  of  movement  were
formally respected,  after that date they became legally subject
to the economic and imperial interests of the state. Article 31 of
the 1933 Constitution reads as follows: “The state has the right
and the obligation of coordinating and regulating the economic
and  social  life  of  the  Nation  with  the  aim of  populating  the
national  territories,  protecting  emigrants  and  disciplining
emigration.” Under  the  scope  of these  objectives,  the  Estado
Novo sought to combine three main aspects: the country’s labour
needs, its interests in Africa and the extra financial capabilities
that came from remittances, promoted by the supervised export
of labour within the  international  market.  The consideration of
these aspects varied over time and had a direct bearing on the
changes in the emigration policy pursued by the government.
The legal  framework  for controlling and disciplining emigration
began to be constructed quite early on, in fact well before 1933.
But, with one exception that will be referred to later on, most of
the legislation enacted before 1933 was intended to control and
protect  the emigrant  and not  to restrict  departures.  The same
cannot,  however,  be  said  of  the  Law  adopted  in  1944
(Decree-Law No. 33:918 of September 5) which forbade the issue
of an ordinary passport to any industrial worker or rural labourer.
Operating in conjunction with the Law of 1929 (Decree-Law No.
16:782 of April  27),  which forbade anybody aged over 14 and
under 45 unable to prove that they had successfully completed
their primary  school  education from migrating,  this law barred
most  of the  population from emigration,  given the  Portuguese
society’s  endemic  illiteracy  of  the  society,  and  laid  the
foundations  for  the  adoption of discretionary  decisions  by  the
emigration services.
Such legal  provisions  would  in fact  have  had little  effect  if a
coordinating  system had  not  been  brought  into  existence.  In
1947,  after  a  temporary  total  ban  on  emigration,  a  special
government  agency,  simultaneously  dependent  on the  Foreign
and  Home  Ministries,  was  created  to  regulate  and  supervise
emigration (Decree-Law No. 36:558 of October 28). This service
was called Junta da Emigração  (Emigration Committee),  and it
had the specific strategic goal  of implementing a quota system
that would define the maximum number of departures by region
and occupation after taking into account regional  labour needs
and the structure of the active population.
If we consider that  annual  average departures did not  exceed
11,000 a year during the 1930s and fell  to 9,000 a year during
the 1940s, such interest in controlling emigration is at first quite
astounding, particularly since emigration was no longer a viable
option due to the course of international events. It did, however,
obey  the  rationale  of  the  corporatist  regime  of  submitting
individual rights to the collective interest, and later on met the
need for using the safety valve mechanism to reduce the existing
demographic surplus, frequently recognised in official statements
during the 1950s (e.g. Diário do Governo 1958:550-887).
In keeping with this same logic,  several  bilateral  treaties were
signed during the 1960s,  namely with the Netherlands,  France
and the  Federal  Republic  of Germany.  These  treaties,  openly
entered into in order to ensure a greater control of emigration, as
well as to maximise the economic returns brought by emigration
to these countries, must, however, be considered alongside the
internal legislation adopted during this period (e.g. Decree-Law
No. 44:422 of June 29, 1962). This legislation further cemented
the links between state  control  of emigration,  and information
about domestic labour needs and government economic targets.
To the text  of the law,  the government  seems to have added
some  subtle  provisions,  namely  giving  directions  to  the
Emigration  Services  to  allow  a  maximum  of  only  30,000
departures a year and to ban legal departures of certain specific
occupations, even when such measures were in conflict with the
text of the bilateral treaties signed (Cassola Ribeiro 1987:75).
The compound effect of the bilateral  treaties and the domestic
measures taken during the 1960s was to ensure a migratory flow
that  the  state  did not  consider to be  harmful  to  the  country’s
labour supply,  but instead beneficial  to the country’s economic
growth.  A  different  idea  seems  to  have  been  held  by  the
traditional  industrial  and rural  elites of the time,  both of them
claiming,  as  in  the  past,  that  legal  and,  above  all,  illegal
emigration  was  producing  significant  labour  shortages  and
causing wages to skyrocket.
The government responded to these complaints with apparently
paradoxical measures. In 1965, illegal emigration ceased to be a
crime punishable by law and the need for a proof of literacy was
suppressed. These measures are puzzling, particularly since they
came at a time when the war in Africa was at its fiercest and the
complaints from the  traditional  economic elites were becoming
louder and louder.
The  government’s  reasoning  was  based  on  two  different
assumptions: first, there was in fact an excess labour supply that
could be profitably exported without endangering the country’s
labour needs; second,  since  the  1950s,  government  economic
policy  had  been  gradually  abandoning  its  initial  strategy  of
promoting,  by  state  intervention,  the  highly  labour-intensive
traditional  industries of northern Portugal  and the  interests of
rural landowners in favour of supporting the creation of a leading
modern industrial sector in the Lisbon area. This industrial sector
would  absorb  most  of  the  existing  labour  supply  of  skilled
workers,  highly-skilled workers and professionals,  the types of
labour  for  which  emigration  had  never  held  any  particular
attraction.
Accordingly, on the eve of the 1974 Revolution, the Corporatist
State  was  about  to  promulgate  the  most  liberal  law  of  this
period,  which the  legislator justified through the  benefits  that
emigration  provided,  namely  gains  in  productivity  and  a
rationalisation of the methods of production, concluding with the
following statement: “emigration,  acting as a positive factor for
modernisation  and  the  rationalisation  of  labour,  has  made  a
powerful  contribution to  the  progress  and development  of the
country.” In view of such an understanding,8 it is no surprise that
the  government  opted  for  a  liberal  emigration  policy.  Such
liberalisation  came,  however,  at  a  time  when  the  receiving
countries were moving in the opposite direction. In other words,
the  Estado  Novo  was  about  to  open  its  doors  when  other
countries were closing theirs.
Emigration and Economic Policies
As we have just seen,  Portuguese emigration policy during the
Estado Novo may be divided into three main periods.  The first
period runs from 1933 to 1946.  During this period,  emigration
was  controlled  and  disciplined,  not  because  the  departures
taking  place  were  seen as  dangerous  to  the  country’s  labour
supply, nor because the Portuguese were responding en masse to
an international demand that did not in fact exist,  but because
such  legal  measures  were  an  undeniable  obligation  of  the
government,  an integral  part  of the doctrinaire nationalist  and
authoritarian  principles  of  the  regime:  the  subordination  of
individual rights to the collective interest,  the promotion of the
country’s self-sufficiency,  and the defence of a certain isolation
from the exterior.9 In order to implement these principles, social
conflict and competition had to be suppressed or at least closely
regulated.
The economy was legally framed under the scope of these new
principles.  After  1931,  the  industrial  sector  became  regulated
and disciplined,  particularly  in regard to three aspects: output
growth,  the  creation  and  localisation  of  new  or  existing
industries,  and  the  transfer  of  the  site  of  productive  units.10
Protective tariffs were adopted to protect domestic industry from
external competition, whilst the national economy was defended
from  financial  internationalisation  by  the  law  covering  the
‘Nationalisation of Capital’  adopted in 1943.  In Salazar’s  own
words,  this  law  was  enacted  because:  “all  economic  factors
belonging  to  or  acting  within  the  Portuguese  Nation  must  be
integrated  into  the  domestic  economy,  and  must,  above  all,
serve the domestic economy. They must follow its directives and
obey its dictates” (Salazar, Discursos, in Marques 1988:38).
The agricultural sector was subjected to a similar intervention. In
this  sector,  the  main government  measure  was known as  the
‘Wheat Campaign’,  which was particularly active between 1929
and  1938.  It  primarily  took  the  form of direct  subsidies,  low
credit, and major irrigation projects. Finally, with the 1935 law of
‘Economic  Reconstitution’,  the  Estado  Novo  launched  several
major public works projects for the period.  These projects were
carried  out  between  1937  and  1950  and  affected  several
infrastructures,  namely  communications,  harbours,  energy,  the
water supply, the road network and the merchant navy.11
The results of all  this direct state intervention and control over
the economy were that, at least for a while, the country’s grain
production increased significantly, public works greatly improved
the country’s infrastructures, generating a significant amount of
state-sponsored employment.  But,  as Marques (1988) stressed,
the  first  and  most  important  result  of  the  Estado  Novo’s
intervention on the economy was that competition was replaced
by state intervention. As may be expected, Salazar judged these
results quite differently: “...although the largest projects are not
yet contributing to the general well-being, the progress achieved
during these last few years is in fact remarkable... And no single
sign of progress is more revealing than to have guaranteed work
and food for the population, which now grows, does not emigrate
and enjoys ever greater standards of living” (Salazar, Discursos,
1961: XXII-XXIII).
The second period corresponds roughly to the 1950s. During this
period,  the  Estado  Novo  progressively  changed  its  previous
economic  discourse  to  a  discourse  favouring  the  country’s
industrialisation  on  a  path  leading  to  progress  and
modernisation.  When the First Development Plan was launched
in 1953, it was Salazar who stated:
 
It is known that industry has higher returns than agriculture and
that only through industrialisation can the standards of living of
the population be decidedly improved. Only with industrialisation is
it  possible to  attain  high  demographic  densities  without  serious
danger. Without a given level of industrialisation, we will have no
internal market for some rural productions, nor can we restrict an
excessive level  of  emigration,  which,  in  some cases,  is  already
occurring  under  conditions  we  deem  to  be  unsatisfactory.  ...
Industrialisation  has to  be carried  out and  encouraged,  for the
above-mentioned reasons.... (Discursos, 1959:103, 104)
Aware  that  the  existing  population surplus  in  the  countryside
could  not  be  significantly  channelled  to  Africa,  and convinced
that  the  country’s  progress  had  to  be  achieved  through
industrialisation,  the  government  tolerated  the  formation  and
development of a new migratory movement to Europe, allowing
the  spread of channels  of information and support,  within the
parameters legally defined in the previous period.
The third period covers the remaining years of the regime,  i.e.
until  1974.  It  was  a  period  of  change  marked  by  the
internationalisation of the economy12 and a substantial  rate of
economic growth. The rationale for the changes taking place can
be found in the words of the Secretary of State for the Economy,
Correia  de  Oliveira,  who,  in  1966,  attributed  the  country’s
backwardness in relation to the other European economies to the
longlasting protection of domestic industry against competition,
innovation and modern technology, as well as to the sacrifice of
the agricultural sector to the development of industry (Marques
1988:93). On this last point, he wrote: “We based our industrial
development on low wages, and these on low food prices, which
were  in turn based  on fixed and frozen prices  for  agricultural
products. Having been maintained for so long, these prices have
discouraged  investment  in  the  agricultural  sector”  (quoted  in
Marques 1988: 93).
During this period, the interests of the traditional economic elites
(northern  textile  and  consumer  good  industries  and  rural
landowners) lost ground to the leading economic,  financial  and
industrial  groups,  based  in  the  Lisbon  area  and  much  less
dependent than the traditional elites on the rural and unskilled
population.  Faced with a  war in Africa  that  absorbed 50%  of
public  revenue,  and  aware  that  emigration  could  effectively
absorb a large part of the rural exodus essential to the country’s
modernisation,  the  Estado  Novo  embarked  upon  a  gradual
process of liberalising emigration. Notice, for example, that while
the  Plano Intercalar de  Fomento  (Interim Growth Plan) (1964)
provided for the creation of 20,000 thousand new jobs between
1965 and 1967 (Rocha 1982:1048), the emigration services were
by  that  time  receiving  instructions  to  allow  30,000  annual
departures,  which seems to indicate  that  the  state  considered
that most of the rural exodus was to be absorbed abroad and not
domestically.
The  analysis  of the  main  laws  enacted  during  the  corporatist
regime and the discourse of the several economic actors affected
by emigration raise a central question: was the state making a
correct assessment of the domestic situation when it based the
liberalisation of emigration on the  assumption that  emigration
would not be harmful to the country’s labour needs and, in fact,
judged emigration to be beneficial  because it helped foster the
country’s  modernisation  by  easing  its  transformation  from an
economic structure heavily marked by the size of the agricultural
sector to a more balanced one? To answer this question,  I will
briefly  consider  the  socio-demographic  characteristics  of
migrants, some indicators on the evolution of the economic and
demographic impact  of emigration,  and finally  the evolution of
the labour market.
Some Main Characteristics of Portuguese Emigration
Between 1933 and 1974, approximately 1.98 million Portuguese
left the country; 32% of the departures took place clandestinely.
Close  to  three-quarters of this exodus occurred between 1961
and 1974 (see Table 1 and Graph 1). Until 1960, more than 80%
of migrants headed for the Americas,  with Brazil  accounting for
most of the flow: 80% until 1949 and 68% during the 1950s (5).
After  1960,  the  main destination of the  Portuguese  migratory
flow  was  Western  Europe  (75%  of  the  total),  and  more
specifically France and Germany (Baganha 1990, 1994 and 1998)
(6). Table 1 and Fig. 1 can be summarised very briefly as follows:
Portuguese  emigration grew constantly  and  substantially  from
1950,  when  departures  numbered  22,000,  to  1970,  when
departures numbered 183,000.  It  declined from 1971 onwards,
when  departures  numbered  158,000.  The  peak  years  of
Portuguese  emigration  after  the  Second  World  War  occurred
between 1965 and 1974,  when the  average  annual  number of
departures  was  122,000  thousand  migrants.  A  crude  but
representative  image  of  Portuguese  emigration  can  thus  be
expressed by three lines: an ascending line from 1950 to 1964
(with  the  following  numerical  limits:  22,000  and  76,000);  a
horizontal line from 1965 to 1974 (at 122,000) and a descending
line from 1975 to 1979 (falling from 52,000 to 29,000).
The social and demographic characteristics of emigrants are not
very clearly known after 1960, when the official register covered
less than half of the departures actually  taking place.  Prior to
1960, the typical emigrant was a single male, aged 15 to 35, and
predominantly  of rural  origin.  From 1960 to  the  early  1970s,
when the  process of family  reunification became predominant,
and based on the registers of the receiving countries,  what we
know is that the flow was predominantly composed of males of an
active age with few or no skills; departures were regarded both
individually  as well  as socially  as a  temporary  situation,  as a
stage  in  a  life  cycle.  And  finally,  when compared  with  other
migratory  flows,  Portuguese emigration showed a considerable
financial return in the form of remittances (Sopemi 1991,1992).
In short, Portuguese emigration was essentially an international
movement of labour, mostly composed of migrants with few or no
skills.  Due to the volume it attained and the financial  return it
yielded,  such  emigration  had  an  enormous  economic  and
demographic impact on Portuguese society.
Demographic and Economic Impact of Emigration
The  analysis  of the  natural  and effective  demographic  growth
occurring between 1931 and 1980 shows that  over half of the
country’s natural  growth was absorbed by  emigration,13  which
means  that  the  impact  of  emigration  on  the  country’s
demographic growth was considerably greater, given that a part
of the potential  growth never took place,  since a considerable
proportion  of  the  population  of  childbearing  age  had  left  the
country permanently (Nazareth 1976). It thus seems reasonable
to  accept  that  emigration  acted  as  an  efficient  demographic
safety valve during this period.
That the returns yielded by emigration in the form of remittances
were of considerable influence on the country’s economy is also
undeniable. Two indicators are often mentioned to demonstrate
the impact of emigration on the Portuguese economy; the ratio of
remittances  to  exports  and  the  ratio  of remittances  to  Gross
Domestic  Product.  Both corroborate  what  has  just  been said.
Table 3 summarises the evolution of remittances when compared
to  exports in the  period from 1950 to  1979.  According to  the
data,  remittances bore a ratio of about 13% to exports during
the 1950s,  25% in the 1960s,  and 56% in the 1970s.  Table 3
summarises the evolution of remittances in relation to GDP from
1950 to 1979.  The figures show that remittances were of ever
growing importance in relation to GDP - 2% in the 1950s, 4% in
the 1960s, and 8% in the 1970s.
In  short,  during  this  period  emigration  was  the  single  most
valuable  export,  since  no  other goods or services had such a
share of Portuguese exports (15). It makes no difference whether
we  consider  remittances  to  be  a  major  safety  net  for  the
country’s imports or an addition to the country’s own productive
capacities; the conclusion is the same. The impact of emigration
on  the  Portuguese  economy  was  drastic  and  increased
throughout the period.  This point is of some importance,  since,
as  has  been  successfully  argued,  “to  benefit  fully  from
remittances, the sending country must be able to depend on the
flow being consistent and reliable, not subject to fluctuations or
secular  decline”  (Heisler  1985:472).  As  has  been  seen,  the
evolution of Portuguese emigrants’ remittances fits this pattern.
In the last part of this work, I shall  try to assess the impact of
emigration  on  the  Portuguese  labour  market  throughout  the
1960s,  the  period  when,  as  we  have  just  seen,  most  of  the
departures took place. The question that I will to try and answer
is the following: was emigration harmful to Portuguese economic
growth? Or to  put  it  slightly  differently,  had those  departures
never  taken  place,  could  this  situation  have  contributed  to
economic growth?
Emigration and Economy
The  answer  to  the  above  question  may  be  approached  from
different  perspectives.  My  approach  is  based  on  economic
development studies.14 One of the links that these studies have
highlighted  is  the  interdependence  existing  between  the
structure of human resources, per capita income and the rate of
development of any given economy. The strong correlation found
between the percentage of professional and technical workers in
the  active  population  and  the  level  of  employment  in  the
industrial  sector  is  also  of  great  interest  for  the  present
analysis.15
An analysis  of the  first  relationship,  between the  structure  of
human resources,  per capita income and the growth rate of an
economy, was carried out for the early 1960s by Mário Murteira
(1969).  From  this  analysis,  one  first  result  is  of  particular
interest: countries with an average per capita income of US$600
had  on  average  a  higher  share  of  scientific  and  technical
personnel than did Portugal, whilst the percentage of skilled and
unskilled workers was on average lower than that observed in
Portugal.16  At  that  time,  Portugal  belonged  to  the  group  of
countries that had a per capita income of less than US$600, and
therefore Murteira’s results suggest that given the country’s per
capita  income  and  the  percentage  of  scientific  and  technical
personnel in the country’s active population, job opportunities for
skilled and unskilled workers could not have been very different
from those  existing in the  1960s,  since  the  percentage  of the
active  population  engaged  in  these  types  of occupations  was
already higher than expected.
If we accept that the level of scientific and technical personnel in
the active population restricts the level of industrial employment
in an economy,  then the impact of emigration on the country’s
economic growth can be negative if it is proved that a significant
proportion of the scientific and technical population leaves during
this period. The existing evidence suggests otherwise. Not only
do we know that the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese
who left did not belong to this group, but we know from the study
on wages made by Xavier Pintado that there was no economic
reason for this group to decide to emigrate, since they enjoyed
identical  purchasing  power  and  standards  of  living  to  their
European counterparts.17
Although  an  unknown  number  of  Portuguese  scientific  and
technical workers did in fact leave the country during this period,
as a sign of opposition to the regime or to avoid conscription,
their number was not  large  enough to  have an impact  on the
structure of the active population.  At least this is what can be
inferred from the occupational structure of Portuguese emigrants
entering France in 1970,  where that group represented 0%. Of
the 88,634 entries registered by the National Immigration Office,
only 31 persons belonged to this group (Ferreira 1976:165). It is
true  that  this  was  not  the  only  destination  of  this  group  of
migrants, but if their number were larger, they would have been
mostly  noticeable  in  France.  The  figures  available  on  return
migrants also confirm this point. 92% of the returning population
had  no  more  than  a  primary  school  education,  only  1%  had
attended college, and 85% had not attended any training in the
host  country  (Silva  et  al.  1984:77 and  82).  Furthermore,  we
should note that these figures include the children of returning
migrants and thus are biased towards formal education.18
In short,  the government seems to have correctly assessed the
composition of the outflow when, in the 1973 Bill on Emigration
Policy (Proceedings of the Chamber of Corporations, No. 142, 23
February 1973),  it stated: “emigration of technical  personnel  is
insignificant,  as  is  that  of highly  skilled  workers.” If it  is  not
possible  to  attribute  any  responsibility  for  non-economic
emigration  to  the  country’s  economic  growth,  it  is  even  less
possible to do so in the case of the economic emigration of poorly
skilled or unskilled active or non-active workers, since, given the
distorted structure  of the  active  population at  that  time,  their
actually remaining in the country would have been redundant. In
fact,  all  evidence  suggests  that  their  productive  contribution
could not  be utilized,  in view of the shortage of scientific  and
technical personnel.19
Conclusion
In  this  work,  through  the  description  made  of  Portuguese
emigration policy under the corporatist  regime,  I have tried to
point out that sending countries are more than mere bystanders
in the migratory process. I have, in fact,  gone a step further in
claiming that,  in the Portuguese case,  not only did the Estado
Novo control the migratory flows that were occurring, but it also
used emigration to its own advantage.  I have tried to present
evidence  to  show  that,  from  an  analysis  of  the  individual
characteristics of migrants and their skills,  it  would seem that
their exodus was not harmful to the country’s economic growth
during  the  1960s,  since,  when  compared  to  other  European
countries,  the  percentage  of scientific  and technical  personnel
was far too small  to cope with an industrial  labour force larger
than the existing one.
During  my  work,  I  became  aware  that  my  findings  could
contribute  to  the  longstanding  debate  on  the  benefits  of
emigration to the Portuguese economy. In its simplest form, this
debate is grounded in the basic idea that Portugal exchanges one
productive factor,  labour, for another productive factor,  capital,
in the form of remittances. What is thus evaluated is whether the
substitution  of  labour  by  capital  has  been  beneficial  or
detrimental to the domestic economy.20 The implicit assumption
in this reasoning is  that  emigration is an export  of productive
labour.  My  findings suggest  that,  during this period,  the  most
likely  hypothesis  is  that  the  Portuguese  migratory  flow  was
composed of migrants presenting zero marginal  productivity for
the domestic economy.
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1 Sedas Nunes, 1964; Almeida and Barreto, 1976; Serräo, 1977;
Godinho, 1978.
2 Ferreira, 1976; Pereira and Barosa, 1989; Pereira, 1989.
3 Between 1950 and 1959, Italians represented more than half of
the total foreign inflow. In 1960, Spaniards equalled the number
of  Italians  entering  France,  with  each  nationality  contributing
30,000  migrants  to  a  total  of  72,600  arrivals.  The Spaniards
replaced  the Italians as the main  suppliers of  foreign  labour to
France from 1961 to 1965. From 1966 to 1972, Portugal replaced
Spain as France’s main supplier of immigrant labour.
4 Office National d’ Immigration for the given years, in Antunes,
1973, 73 and 109.
5 See Seruya, in Stahl et al.,  1982, Kritz et al.,  1983, Böhning,
1984, and Branco, 1986.
6 It  is  not  possible to  dissociate the formal  beginning  of  the
Corporative Regime from the preceding  Military Dictatorship  that
began  on  May  28,  1926,  particularly  after  António  Salazar
re-entered  the government in  1928 as the Secretary of  State for
Finance,  because the legal  framework that  supported  and  gave
coherence  to  the  doctrinaire  foundations  of  the  Estado  Novo
began to be enacted during this period.
7 For a  different interpretation of  the impact of  the Estado Novo
on emigration see, Leeds, 1984.
8  A  little  earlier,  Murteira  and  Branquinho’s  analysis  of  the
country’s  economic  performance  had  led  them  to  a  similar
conclusion: ‘The relatively slow growth  in  employment  (naturally
together with the rapid increase in productivity) leads us to believe
that  the  [positive]  evolution  of  industrial  productivity  may
somehow have been a consequence of emigration,...
Both wages and productivity are well below European levels,  but
while the second has risen faster than its European counterparts,
the first has moved  in  the opposite direction.  One can therefore
conclude that, as far as labour costs are concerned, the evolution
has  favoured  the  Portuguese  employers.’  A.  Murteira  and
Branquinho, 1969:581
9 For a detailed analysis of the ideological bases of the regime, see
Braga  da  Cruz,  1984:773-794  and,  for  an  analysis  of  its
economic policy, see Marques, 1988.
10 Law No. 19 354 of  January of  1931 (Lei do Condicionamento
Industrial – the Law of Industrial Conditioning). Law No. 1956 of
May 1937 changed the character of the measures adopted in 1931
from temporary to permanent.
11 For a  detailed appraisal of the economic policy of this period,
see Marques, 1988.
12 In 1959, a much less protective tariff was adopted and in 1961
Portugal joined EFTA.
13 Between 1931 and 1970, the country’s natural growth (births
minus deaths) was 3,839.9 million and the effective growth (i.e.
the difference between the population present in the country at the
beginning  and  at  the end  of  the period) was  1,742.8  million
(computed from the Boletim Anual, SEECP, 1980).
14 E.g. Murteira, et al., 1969; Carvalho, 1967.
15  An  analysis  of  the  interdependence  between  industrial
employment and scientific and technical manpower was carried out
by Gnanasekaran (1965), who found a series of links that made it
possible to  express the interdependence between the structure of
human resources and economic development.
16 It can be inferred from the results presented by Murteira (1969:
24, 29) that countries with a  per capita  income of US $600 had
on  average  4.6%  of  scientific,  technical,  and  artistic  active
individuals, and 23.13% of skilled and unskilled active individuals.
In  Portugal,  in  1960,  such  percentages  were 2.8% and  27.9%
respectively.
17 Xavier Pintado stated as follows: ‘in terms of purchasing power
and standards of living, top-level management has higher salaries
in  Portugal  than  in  other  industrialised  countries.’  Pintado,
1967:73. See also, Carvalho, 1967.
18 Poinard, 1963, Amaro, 1985, and Martins, 1986.
19 In fact, in view of the structure existing in 1960 and 1970, the
expected  proportion  of  scientific  and  technical  personnel  would
have been roughly twice that of Portugal.
20  In  the Portuguese case,  more often  than  not,  the positive
effects,  namely  the  share  of  the  remittances  channelled  to
productive investment  and  the benefits  deriving  from some new
skills acquired by the returning migrants, were judged insufficient
to  compensate for the loss of  manpower.  Firstly,  because,  when
compared  to  the  share  of  remittances  used  for  private
consumption,  the  impact  of  emigration  on  domestic  capital
formation was considered to be small; secondly, because even this
small  effect  was  considered  to  be  offset  by  the  inflationary
tendencies produced by the higher purchasing power of a growing
segment  of  the population  receiving  extra  income from abroad;
and,  thirdly,  because at  the level  that  emigration  reached  after
1960 it endangered the country’s labour supply.
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